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Abstract 
We investigated 4-year-olds’ understanding of the compositional semantics of 
adjective/noun combinations, and how these representations relate to statistical 
knowledge of the sizes of objects in a set. In Experiments 1 and 2, children selected tall 
and short items from an array of nine novel objects called pimwits (1-9 inches in height), 
or from this array plus 4 taller or shorter distractor objects of the same kind, which 
altered the average height of the set of objects. Children’s criteria for tall and short 
shifted with the change in the object arrays. When the distractor objects differed in name 
and surface features from the target set (Exp. 3), they did not shift children’s judgments. 
However, when these dissimilar distractors were given the same name as target objects 
(Exp. 4), they did affect tall judgments. By 4 years old, children deploy a compositional 
semantics for scalar adjective/noun combinations that is sensitive to shifts in the statistics 
of sets, and is mediated in part by linguistic labels.   3
INTRODUCTION 
The capacity to comprehend and generate novel utterances – and thus to use language 
creatively – depends on knowing that the meanings of complex expressions are a function 
of their syntax and the meanings of their constituent parts. Natural language is, at its core, 
compositional (Frege, 1892). The compositionality of language places important 
constraints not only on theories of concepts and their relation to linguistic structure 
(Fodor & Lepore, 2002), but also on theories of how children acquire language. 
However, while syntactic development has long been a central topic in language 
acquisition, few studies have directly explored the emergence of compositional 
semantics, to determine whether children use the same principles as adults to guide the 
interpretation of new word combinations. This reflects both the empirical difficulties of 
studying meaning (as opposed to form), and the lack a clearly articulated alternate 
hypothesis. Children produce and comprehend multiword utterances from a young age.  
How could they do this, if they were not guided by principles of semantic composition?   
Recent proposals of syntactic development highlight the limitations of this logic.   
Tomasello and colleagues argue that while young children’s early utterances appear to 
respect the syntax of the adult language, they are actually generated by a grammar which 
relies on simpler, item-based, generalizations (Lieven, Behrens, Speares & Tomasello, 
2003; Olguin & Tomasello, 1993; Tomasello, 1992, 2000). Adult-like production (or 
comprehension) of utterances may not necessarily implicate an adult-like representational 
system. Similarly, the apparent compositional nature of young children’s grammar could 
reflect alternate strategies that result in interpretations similar enough to the target 
grammar to evade detection. For example, children might initially learn the meaning of   4
complex expressions directly via ostension (e.g., “tall tree” learned in the context of tall 
trees) and store them whole. Such children might easily point out tall trees when asked. 
However, if their interpretation of tall tree is based on an association between that 
particular NP and trees of a certain size, they might be incapable of interpreting tall in the 
context of other nouns, not previously paired with tall.  
Adjectives can restrict denotation in a number of ways. Intersective adjectives (e.g., 
bumpy, green, Californian) combine with nouns to identify the intersection of two 
independently identifiable sets of things. For example, pet fish picks out the intersection 
of all things that are both pets and fish (||pet|| ∩ ||fish||; see Kamp & Partee, 1995), as 
depicted in (1): 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. At the intersection of pets and fish are pet fish. 
Numerous studies have investigated children’s understanding of intersective 
adjectives to determine how they use syntactic cues to distinguish adjectives and nouns, 
when they use language to distinguish properties from kinds, and how kind information 
restricts the possible meanings of adjectives (Hall, Waxman & Hurwitz, 1993; Gelman & 
Markman 1985, Waxman & Booth, 2001; Klibanoff & Waxman 2000, Mintz & 
Gleitman, 2002; Mintz, 2005). However, the relevance of these studies to evaluating 
children’s understanding of compositionality is potentially limited. Studies demonstrating 
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effects of syntax on novel word interpretation illustrate that children have made mappings 
between syntax and semantics, but they do not necessarily tell us how children combine 
the meanings of words to derive the meanings of phrases. The most relevant studies ask 
children to interpret novel adjectives in unattested adjective-noun combinations. 
However, even these studies are potentially ambiguous. While children might use 
compositional rules to interpret novel combinations of intersective adjectives and nouns, 
a non-compositional strategy would also suffice.  
For example, previous studies report that children 5-years of age and older interpret 
adjective + noun combinations incrementally, restricting the denotation of the expression 
as each word is heard, rather than combining the words to derive a composed meaning. 
Matthei (1982) asked 4- and 5-year-old children were asked to find the “second green 
ball” in an array in which the second ball was green, but was not the second green ball. 
Surprisingly, children failed to pick the correct object and instead picked the second thing 
that was a ball and that was green. As Hamburger and Crain (1984) later demonstrated, 
this observation alone does not show that children lacked access to a compositional 
semantics (since 5- and 6-year-olds succeed when their eyes are covered, preventing 
them from applying each word to the array as it is heard). However, Matthei’s study does 
show that behaviors which are consistent with a compositional semantics may in fact 
reflect a simpler strategy of restricting the denotation of an expression as each individual 
word is heard: in contexts in which the second ball is the second green ball, children’s 
incremental strategy would be indistinguishable from one that draws on compositional 
representations. This is generally true of intersective adjectives (e.g., green, bumpy, pet)   6
and thus these adjectives do not allow us to easily diagnose compositionality in early 
child language.   
A classic case for exploring compositionality in natural language is that of subsective 
adjectives (Partee, 1995). Subsective adjectives provide a better test of compositional 
knowledge, because they are always interpreted relative to the noun with which they 
occur. These include adjectives like tall, short, big, small, quiet and loud. In all cases, the 
interpretation of the adjective clearly depends on the noun. A tall boy is tall for a boy (but 
not for a tree). A loud frog is loud for a frog (but not for a jet). Thus, to interpret these 
expressions, it is not sufficient to find the overlap of the adjective and the noun, or to 
restrict their denotation as each word is encountered in sequence; only the compositional 
relation between the words can define their interpretation. As evidence of this, inferences 
like that in (1) are not valid, whereas equivalent inferences that feature intersective 
adjectives are valid, as in (2) (see Partee, 1995; Kamp & Partee, 1995): 
(1) Goldie is a big fish. 
Goldie is a pet. 
Therefore, Goldie is a big pet. 
(2) Goldie is a black fish 
Goldie is a pet 
Therefore, Goldie is a black pet. 
Instead, subsective adjectives identify subsets of noun denotations such that big fish 
denotes the subset of fish that are big (||big fish|| ⊆ ||fish||). This is depicted in Figure 2:   7
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. “Big fish” are a subset of “fish”. 
For each complex concept in which they participate, subsective adjectives establish a 
unique criterion for identifying exemplars, typically called a “standard of comparison”. 
For example, to determine whether Goldie is a big fish, we need to know the size of 
Goldie and the sizes of other fish. However, to know whether Goldie is a big pet, 
knowing the sizes of fish is not enough. Instead, we need to know something about the 
sizes of pets. In each case, the semantics of the separate simple concepts and their 
respective identification criteria are insufficient for identifying referents of the complex 
concept formed by the subsective adjective-noun combination. Instead, the simple 
concepts must be combined to generate a composed meaning. Consequently, subsective 
adjectives offer an ideal test case for evaluating children’s understanding of 
compositionality.  
1.1. Gradable adjectives and world knowledge 
What do children need to know to deploy a compositional semantics for a phrase like 
tall man? Central to most accounts is the idea that gradable adjectives, like tall, draw on 
orderings of objects for their interpretation. For example, by one account, gradable 
adjectives like tall represent functions that map objects in the world onto scales of 
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degrees (see Cresswell, 1976; Kennedy, 1999). Tall maps objects onto a scale that 
represents degrees of height, big onto a scale of size, and smart onto a scale of 
intelligence. This mapping results in a mental ordering of objects that allows us to decide 
who is bigger, taller, or more intelligent than whom. For example, if John’s degree of 
height is greater than Pete’s, then John is taller than Pete. However, if John’s degree of 
height is less than Pete’s, John is shorter than him. Thus, adjectives create orderings of 
things according to the dimensions they specify (e.g., height, weight, intelligence, etc.).  
For the interpretation of adjectives with comparative morphology (like taller and 
shorter) knowledge of object orderings alone is sufficient. The child does not require a 
kind-based subsective semantics for such forms, since what counts as taller or shorter 
does not shift according to the kind of thing referred to (e.g., basketball players vs. 
jockeys), but merely according to the sizes of the two objects being considered. For 
example, if presented with two men measuring over seven feet and asked to select “The 
taller basketball player” or even “The tall basketball player” we will be forced to choose 
the one with the greater height, despite the fact that both are tall, even relative to other 
basketball players (the definite determiner forces us to make this choice in the latter 
example). In these cases, the standard of comparison is the height of the shorter player, 
and is not determined relative to a kind (the result is the same if we ask which is a taller 
man, a taller object, etc.). However, the situation changes if we are asked whether each 
player is a tall basketball player. Now, instead of one being tall, both are. This judgment 
requires establishing an abstract standard of comparison that is relative to a broader set of 
things. This standard must shift according to the kind of thing referred to, and must take 
account of the sizes of set members. For example, to decide whether John is a tall   9
basketball player, the child needs to know what it means to be tall for a basketball player 
and thus have knowledge about the sizes of basketball players as a class (see Klein, 
1991). Extracting this information about the sizes of things within classes thus involves 
performing a statistical operation – i.e., obtaining a value by applying a function to a set 
of data.  
Exactly how statistical functions are deployed to determine standards of comparison 
is unknown. One possibility, discussed by Bierwisch (1989), is that the value of the 
standard is defined as a population mean: all basketball players that are taller than the 
average height are tall players while those below average are short players. Alternatively, 
the value of the standard may be specified according to a proportion of a set. Tall may 
mean taller than most, rather than taller than average, and pick out the top quarter or 
third of objects in a set regardless of their relation to the average height of the set. In this 
paper, we do not take a stance on the particular statistic that children (or adults) might 
deploy, or whether either of these alternatives is adequate. Regardless of the particular 
statistic that is used to determine the value of the standard, the child must know that a 
standard exists, and have the ability to compute its value for each noun that he or she 
encounters. What is important is that the compositional semantics requires the child to 
employ data about the statistics of sets in the world and to use these statistics in 
identifying and referring to things as tall and short. 
From previous studies, we know that children have some knowledge regarding the 
typical sizes of things. For example, children between 2 and 4 years of age are familiar 
with the typical sizes of things like buttons, mittens, plates, and shoes, and are able to 
judge when things like mittens are big for a mitten (Ebeling & Gelman, 1988; Sera,   10
Troyer & Smith, 1988). Children are also aware that something which is small for a 
person, like a shot glass, may count as big for a doll (Gelman & Ebeling, 1989; Ebeling 
& Gelman, 1994; see also Carey & Potter, reported in Carey, 1978). These studies 
indicate that children know when to apply gradable adjectives like big and small to 
members of particular classes of familiar things. However, they do not indicate how 
children know this, and whether they are using the compositional semantics of gradable 
adjectives and abstract knowledge about comparison classes to do so. Do 3- and 4-year-
old children understand the compositional semantics of adjective-noun combinations like 
big rabbit and tall man? How does their knowledge of real world entities and their typical 
sizes interact with the semantics of gradable adjectives like big, small, tall and short? 
What do children actually know about standards of comparison? 
Although knowing what counts as a big button could well involve knowledge of 
compositionality and statistics, children might initially use simpler strategies. For 
example, children might learn, through ostension, which mitten sizes are typically called 
big or small. Alternatively, they might represent a mental ordering of objects 
(recognizing their relative sizes), but not compute a statistical standard, instead labeling 
things as big or small as a function of their similarity to the biggest or tallest exemplars 
that they have encountered (see Clark, 1970). As noted by Smith, Rattermann and Sera 
(1988), several previous studies have suggested that children might initially interpret 
dimensional terms like big and tall categorically, unlike adults, while others have argued 
that very young children deploy a relational interpretation (see Clark, 1970; Ehri, 1976; 
Gitterman & Johnson, 1983; Sera & Smith, 1987; Nelson & Benedict, 1974). 
Critically, we know of no previous study that has tested what defines a comparison   11
class for children (e.g., the class of things considered when evaluating whether something 
is tall). For adults, comparison classes are defined at least in part by nouns (e.g., a tall 
tree is tall relative to all things named by the noun tree). However, previous studies leave 
open the relative role of kind information in children’s interpretation of adjectives, and 
whether other contextual factors – like contiguity, perceptual similarity, or explicit 
mention of class members – might play a greater role in grouping objects for comparison. 
For example, no previous study has investigated whether applying the same name (e.g., 
blicket) to an array of novel and physically distinct objects is sufficient for grouping these 
objects in a single comparison class for adjective interpretation (though see Waxman & 
Markow, 1995, for evidence that labels are sufficient for considering dissimilar objects as 
members of a single kind; also, see Ryalls, 2000, study involving explicit feedback in 
novel adjective acquisition). 
Perhaps the best existing evidence that children can interpret adjectives according to 
comparison classes comes from a study by Smith and colleagues on children’s 
interpretation of high and low (Smith, Cooney & McCord, 1986; see also Hamburger & 
Crain, 1984). Though other studies have tested whether children can identify big or tall 
items in a single novel array (e.g., Syrett et al., 2006), this study is alone in manipulating 
the distribution of object sizes (or heights, in this case) across conditions, a manipulation 
which is critical for assessing whether children take properties of whole sets into 
consideration when applying gradable adjectives. Smith and colleagues found that 5-
year-olds but not 4-year-olds shifted their judgments of what heights counted as high 
based on the range of heights they saw presented in the study, suggesting that the older 
group computed a context sensitive standard. However, words like high and low are   12
perhaps not ideal cases for evaluating this possibility, since they have both subsective 
meanings (e.g., high for a shelf) and intersective meanings (e.g., high off the ground, 
independent of kind). Although there is evidence that children can distinguish intersective 
adjectives from subsective adjectives (Syrett et al., 2006), it remains open whether they 
have a preference for one or another interpretation when both are available. Thus, it is 
possible that 4-year-olds understand how statistical properties of comparison classes shift 
standards for the interpretation of adjectives, but that they, unlike older children, favor an 
intersective interpretation of words like high and low.  
To summarize, interpreting subsective gradable adjectives like tall and short requires 
not only knowledge of the compositional semantics of adjective-noun combinations, but 
also knowledge of how adjectives specify a standard of comparison based on knowledge 
about the size distributions of sets in the world. Currently, it is unclear when children are 
first able to integrate statistical properties of sets to compute standards of comparison for 
adjectives like big and tall. Also, there is little evidence to suggest a deep understanding 
of the compositionality of adjective-noun pairs. Existing studies have focused on 
adjective-noun pairs that children may have learned through ostension, training 
paradigms, and comparative forms of adjectives that do not require computing standards, 
or they have tested adjectives that can be interpreted without appeal to the compositional 
semantics of adjective-noun combinations (e.g., high, low). Thus, no previous study has 
examined how children interpret adjectives according to statistically specified 
comparison classes, and whether they actually use linguistic kind information to specify 
sets and compute standards of comparison.  
This study investigated how young children deploy the compositional semantics of   13
adjective-noun combinations in the context of novel nouns. Doing this allowed us to 
address three issues. First, we investigated whether children are sensitive to the statistical 
properties of sets when interpreting adjective-noun combinations. By testing children’s 
understanding of complex concepts like tall pimwit and short pimwit, we explored 
whether they compute standards for novel sets of objects, while ensuring that previous 
ostensive learning could not account for their behavior. Second, we tested children’s 
sensitivity to variation in the statistical properties of object arrays when computing a 
standard. Third, we explored how children restrict comparison classes. For expressions 
like tall pimwit, do children use linguistic kind information to restrict the comparison 
class for tall, or do they rely initially on a non-linguistic contextual grouping based on 
perceptual similarity or spatio-temporal contiguity?  
EXPERIMENT 1 
The first experiment explored 4-year-olds’ application of the adjectives tall and short 
for an array of novel objects. Of interest was whether children would spontaneously 
consider the objects as a comparison class and apply adjectives in a systematic fashion, 
indicative of using a standard of comparison (e.g., mean height). This condition also 
established a baseline for assessing children’s ability to shift the value or standard that 
defines tall and short (in Experiment 2), and their ability to calculate this value based on 
specific kinds of objects, as specified by nouns (Experiments 3 and 4). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 16 4-year-olds (M: 4;6, range 4;0 – 4;11; 5 boys, 11 girls). Children 
were tested either in a childcare center or in the laboratory. All children were native   14
speakers of English.  
Procedures and Stimuli 
Each testing session comprised two trials: one “short” trial and one “tall” trial. On 
each trial children were asked to examine a row of pseudo-randomly ordered novel 
objects and decide which were either tall (on tall trials) or short (on short trials). To 
indicate their choice, they were asked to move the relevant objects into a red plastic 
circle. For both types of trial the objects were as follows: 9 cylinders, ¼-inch in diameter, 
increasing in height from 1-inch to 9-inches in 1-inch intervals. The objects were painted 
pink and had a flat hairdo (made of foam) and a face (including googly eyes).  
To begin, each child was given a categorization pre-test. Sets of toy oranges, bananas, 
and strawberries were given to the child who was then asked to place the members of 
each set, one set at a time, into a red plastic circle 6-inches in diameter: e.g., “Can you 
put the bananas into the red circle?” Following each set, the circle was emptied and the 
children were asked to place the next set in the circle. For each trial, all fruit types were 
available to the child, thus forcing them to select only the relevant kind of fruit and place 
it in the circle. Once children had successfully placed each set in the circle one time (with 
three consecutive successes), they moved to the experimental trials. 
On the experimental trials, the experimenter stood the test objects in a row in one of 
two pseudo-random orders. The heights of objects in inches were as follows:  
Order 1: 9, 3, 5, 4, 8, 6, 2, 7, 1 
Order 2: 7, 9, 2, 8, 4, 1, 6, 3, 5 
Objects were arranged pseudo-randomly, rather than in series, to render the relations 
between objects less transparent, and to avoid the clustering of distractor objects in later   15
experiments. Having arranged the objects, the experimenter then said “Look! These are 
some pimwits. Have you ever seen any pimwits before? No? Well, can you do me a 
favor? Can you touch all of the pimwits like this?” The experimenter then touched each 
pimwit and prompted the child to do the same. This ensured that children were aware of 
all objects in the array. Next, the experimenter asked the child to find either the tall or 
short pimwits and place them in the red circle: “Can you look at all of the pimwits and 
find the tall pimwits and put the tall pimwits in the red circle” or “Can you look at all of 
the pimwits and find the short pimwits and put the short pimwits in the red circle?” Half 
of the children were given the short trial first and half were given the tall trial first. 
Objects were returned to their original locations in the row of pimwits between tall and 
short trials. Thus children were free to label an object as both tall and as short (though 
only 2 children out of 80 reported in this paper ever did so). 
Following the tall-short judgments, each child was asked to perform “taller” and 
“shorter” judgments to assess their knowledge of comparative morphology. For “taller” 
judgments, the experimenter presented the child with the 1-inch object and the 3-inch 
object and asked “Which pimwit is taller”. For the “shorter” judgments, the child was 
shown the 9-inch object and the 7-inch object and asked “Which pimwit is shorter”. 
Thus, “taller” judgments were always made on objects that were likely to be labeled as 
short, and “shorter” judgments were made on objects that were likely to be labeled as 
tall. Children who received “tall” before “short” in the tall-short task were given the 
“taller” judgment before the “shorter” judgment, and the order was reversed for children 
who received “short” trials first. 
Results and Discussion   16
Tall and short judgments 
Responses for the tall judgments were coded as either “tall” or “not tall”. Responses 
for the short judgments were coded as either “short” or “not short”. The dependent 
variable for “tall” was the average minimum height children categorized as tall. For 
“short” the dependent variable was the average maximum height children categorized as 
short. These dependent variables were used rather than mean height of the selected 
objects since we were interested in identifying the standard or “cutoff” for each adjective. 
 
Figure 3. The average minimum height categorized as “tall” for Experiments 1 – 4.    17
Figure 4. The average maximum height categorized as “short” for Experiments 1 – 4. 
 
Children’s average minimum selection for tall was 7.19 inches, while the average 
maximum for short was 3.19 inches (see Figures 3, 4, and 5). Data were submitted to a 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with adjective order (tall first vs. short 
first) and object order (order 1 vs. order 2) as between-subject variables and adjective as a 
within-subject variable (tall vs. short). There was a significant difference between the 
average minimum height of objects called tall and the average maximum height of 
objects called short, F (1, 12) = 69.0, p < .001, but no effect of order or interaction 
between adjective and order. Thus, children clearly distinguished between tall and short 
for a novel array of objects.   18
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Figure 5. Percentage of children that judged each height of object to be tall or short in 
Experiment 1.  
 
Children showed an intriguing difference between their understanding of tall  and 
short. Though all children called the tallest object tall, only 11 of 16 called the shortest 
object short. The average maximum height of objects called tall was 9 inches, while the 
average minimum for short was 1.56 inches. For children who didn’t pick the shortest 
object as short, the average minimum was 2.8 inches (N=5, range = 2” to 4”). This 
difference between tall and short resembles an asymmetry found in children’s 
interpretation of high and low, reported by Smith et al. (1986). Children almost always 
agreed that the highest heights in their experiment were high but agreed less frequently 
that the lowest values were low. These results and previous ones (e.g., Donaldson & 
Wales, 1970; Ehri, 1976; Ryalls, 2000; Townsend, 1976) suggest that children generally 
master “positive” terms like tall earlier than “negative” terms like short.  
On several occasions during this experiment and in those reported below, children 
insisted that the shortest objects in a set were not short but instead were small or little. 
This can be interpreted in one of two ways. On one hand, given the observation that 
children acquire the terms big and small before tall and short (Clark, 1973, 1974;   19
Maratsos, 1973), they may be reluctant to apply short and small to the same objects. 
Mutual exclusivity (Markman, 1988) may lead them to assign middle values to short, 
with no other meaning available (presumably the greater frequency and earlier 
acquisition of big and tall could explain why children in this study do not show a similar 
effect for tall). However, a second possibility is that children, like adults, place geometric 
restrictions on the kinds of things that can be placed on the tall-short continuum (see 
Bierwisch, 1989). The shortest objects may have been called small not because children 
failed to understand short, but because, as with pebbles or balls, very short pimwits did 
not feature a sufficiently large ratio between their height and width to merit the term.  
Comparatives: Taller and shorter judgments 
Judgments for the comparative forms taller and shorter were available for 15 of the 
16 children. All 15 answered correctly to both the taller and shorter questions. Also, all 
of the children who failed to call the shortest object short in the first part of the 
experiment nonetheless had no difficulty interpreting shorter, even in the context of tall 
objects. Thus, although we found an asymmetry between tall and short in the first part of 
the experiment, we did not replicate previous reports (e.g., Ryalls, 2000) that children of 
this age have difficulty interpreting shorter relative to taller. Further, we failed to find 
this effect even though children were asked to pick the shorter of two tall objects or the 
taller of two short ones. In Experiments 2-4 described below, all children (N=64) 
responded correctly to taller and shorter judgments, and thus results for those conditions 
will not be reported further. 
Summary 
To conclude, we found that 4-year-olds were able to systematically select tall and   20
short items from an array of novel objects. Further, we found an asymmetry between tall 
and short judgments, but no corresponding asymmetry for taller and shorter judgments. 
This result resembles the asymmetry found by Smith et al. (1986) between high and low. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The second experiment assessed children’s sensitivity to the statistical properties of 
object arrays when applying the adjectives tall and short. Previous studies of children this 
age have demonstrated that their interpretation of adjectives is flexible and influenced by 
the objects that are available in a context (e.g., Syrett et al., 2006; Sera & Smith, 1989). 
However, these studies did not address the role of kind information, or require that 
statistical information be used to calculate the standard of comparison, since they tested 
children with comparisons among object pairs (akin to studies that examine the 
interpretation of comparative forms like taller and shorter).  
To assess whether 4-year-old children can access statistical information regarding the 
sizes of set members to calculate a standard, we tested children in two conditions using 
modified versions of the object arrays used in Experiment 1. In the “short distractor” 
condition, four distractor objects were added to the original array of nine objects. The 
distractors were identical to those in the original array but were relatively short: .5-
inches, 1-inch, 1.5-inches, 2-inches. Adding these items reduced the mean height of 
objects in the array from 5 inches to 3.85 inches. In the “tall distractor” condition, the 
four additional objects measured 8, 8.5, 9, and 9.5 inches, thereby increasing the average 
height of objects from 5 inches to 6.15 inches. We predicted that if children are sensitive 
to the statistical properties of the arrays, they should shift their tall and short judgments 
accordingly. When presented the baseline set with shorter distractors they should include   21
more of the original nine objects as tall and fewer of the original nine as short. For taller 
distractors they should include fewer of the original objects as tall and more as short. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 32 4-year-olds (M: 4;6, range 3;11 – 4;11.15; 18 boys, 14 girls), 
who had not participated in Experiment 1. Children were tested either in a childcare 
center or in the laboratory. All children were native speakers of English. Half were 
assigned to condition 1 (shorter distractors; mean age 4;5) and half to condition 2 (taller 
distractors; mean age 4;6). 
Procedures and Stimuli 
Procedures for Experiment 2 were identical to those used in Experiment 1. However, 
in addition to the nine original objects there were four distractor objects. For condition 1, 
four short distractor objects were added, measuring: .5, 1, 1.5 and 2 inches. These 
distractor objects were mixed pseudo-randomly amongst the other nine objects to 
produce two different array orders. Objects were ordered as follows in Orders 1 and 2 of 
condition 1 (distractors are indicated with < >):  
Order 1: 9, 3, <.5>, 5, 4, <1>, 8, 6, <1.5>, 2, 7, <2>, 1 
Order 2: 7, 9, <.5>, 2, 8, <1>, 4, 1, <1.5>, 6, 3, <2>, 5 
For condition 2, four tall distractor objects were added measuring: 8, 8.5, 9, and 9.5 
inches. The objects were ordered as follows for Orders 1 and 2 of condition 2:  
Order 1: 9, 3, <8>, 5, 4, <8.5>, 8, 6, <9>, 2, 7, <9.5>, 1 
Order 2: 7, 9, <8>, 2, 8, <8.5>, 4, 1, <9>, 5, 6, 3, <9.5>, 5 
In familiarization, children were asked to touch each of the pimwits on its head, and   22
thus they touched the distractor objects in addition to the target objects. 
Results and Discussion 
Tall and short judgments 
To assess the effect of adding shorter items vs. taller items to the novel object arrays, 
we compared tall and short judgments from Conditions 1 and 2. First, for tall judgments, 
data were submitted to an ANOVA with adjective order (tall first vs. short first), object 
order (order 1 vs. order 2), and condition (short distractors vs. tall distractors) as 
between-subject variables. The dependent variable was the average minimum height of 
objects called tall. Children picked a greater minimum height on average for tall 
judgments in the tall distractor condition (M = 8.44 inches) compared to the short 
distractor condition (M = 5.44), F (1, 24) = 44.88, p < .001 (see Figures 3, 4, 6, and 7). 
There were no main effects or interactions due to order of adjectives or object order. 
Second, a parallel ANOVA found that children picked a greater maximum height on 
average for short judgments in the tall distractor condition (M = 3.69) compared to the 
short distractor condition (mean = 2.19), F (1, 24) = 8.08, p < .01. Again, there were no 
significant main effects or interactions due to order of adjectives or object order. These 
results indicate that differences between the two arrays had significant effects on 
children’s interpretation of both tall and short. 
We next compared each condition of Experiment 2 to the baseline condition of 
Experiment 1. First, consider the short distractor condition. Children picked a greater 
minimum height on average for tall judgments in Experiment 1 (M = 7.19) compared to 
judgments in condition 1 (M = 5.44), F (1, 24) = 12.92, p < .001. There were no main 
effects or interactions due to order of adjectives or object order. Second, children picked   23
a greater maximum height on average for short judgments in Experiment 1 (M = 3.19) 
compared to condition 1 (M = 2.19), F (1, 24) = 4.68, p < .05. Again, there were no main 
effects or interactions due to order of adjectives or object order. Thus, when four short 
objects of the same kind were added to the original array of Experiment 1, the standards 
for both tall and short were lower relative to Experiment 1.  
For the tall distractor condition, objects that children categorized as tall had a greater 
minimum height on average (M = 8.44 inches) relative to Experiment 1 (7.19 inches), F 
(1, 24) = 17.14, p < .001. There were no main effects or interactions due to order of 
adjectives or object order. However, their judgments for short did not differ significantly 
between Experiment 1 (3.19 inches) and condition 2 of Experiment 2 (M = 3.69), F (1, 
24) = 0.81, p > .05, though there was a trend in the predicted direction.  Thus, while the 
addition of tall distractors had a significant effect on children’s criteria for the application 
of tall it did not in this case appear to affect their application of short, at least relative to 
Experiment 1. One observation relevant to interpreting children’s application of short is 
the fact that several children again failed to call the shortest objects short in both 
conditions of Experiment 2 (2 in each condition). This suggests that children may still be 
acquiring the semantics of short, and may not yet be in a position to systematically shift 
its application as a function of height distributions in a set. We return to this question 
again later in the paper. 
To summarize, two manipulations generated evidence that 4-year-olds can shift their 
standard of comparison appropriately for tall when the statistical properties of the object 
array were modified. Children also exhibited signs of understanding how differences in 
height distributions shift the application of short, though this effect was less robust.    24
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Figure 6. Percentage of children that judged each height of object as tall in Exp. 1 and 2. 
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Figure 7. Percentage of children that judged each height of object as short in Experiments 
1 and 2.  
EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that 4-year-old children are able to extract statistical 
information from a novel array of objects and compute an implicit standard of 
comparison for the application of adjectives like tall and short. This capacity is sensitive 
to small shifts in the statistical properties of object arrays, with significant differences 
being incurred by the addition of a few additional objects. 
In order to compute a standard for interpreting comparative adjectives, children must 
presumably first determine what the class of objects is that is relevant to comparison. For   25
adults, this is determined in large part on the basis of kind information for expressions 
like “find the tall pimwits”. In such cases, things are deemed tall or short relative to a 
kind of thing. However, no previous study has examined how children segregate novel 
objects into discrete comparison classes, and if this is based on kind information. In other 
constructions, the standard of comparison is determined contextually. For example, the 
expression “that watch is expensive” may be true in a context where the watch is only $5, 
but is found at a garage sale where all other objects are below $1. This differs from “that 
is an expensive watch” which almost always means “expensive for a watch”. Children 
may not realize this distinction early in acquisition, and may be sensitive to context (e.g., 
the properties of adjacent objects) when interpreting adjectives in both types of 
construction. 
Experiment 3 investigated 4-year-olds’ sensitivity to kind information in establishing 
a comparison class and whether proximity with different-kind distractors interferes with 
the use of kind information. To do this, the original nine objects of Experiment 1 were 
presented to children together with 4 additional objects that were identical to the 4 short 
distractors added in Condition 1 of Experiment 2, except that they were of a different 
kind (i.e., different color, surface features, and name). Thus, all that differed from the 
short distractor condition of Experiment 2 was the kind status of the additional objects. 
Of interest was whether these different-kind objects would interfere with judgments for 
the other nine objects (resulting in judgments like those from Experiment 2) or whether 
children would use kind information to exclude these items from the comparison class 
(resulting in judgments like those from Experiment 1). 
Method   26
Participants 
Participants were 16 English-speaking children not tested in Experiments 1 and 2 (M: 
4;5, range 4;0 – 4;11; 13 boys, 3 girls). Children were tested either in a childcare center 
or in the laboratory. 
Procedures and Stimuli 
Procedures for Experiment 3 were identical to those used in the short distractor 
condition of Experiment 2, except that the four distractor objects were of a different kind. 
Distractors were cylinders like those in Experiment 2, but were painted silver with black 
dots resembling rivets and had flat hexagon shapes on either end (resulting in dumb-bell 
like objects). Also, they were called “tulvers” rather than “pimwits”. The distractor 
objects were mixed pseudo-randomly amongst the other nine objects to produce two 
different array orders (identical to the orders used in the short distractor condition of 
Experiment 2). In familiarization, children were asked to touch the pimwits, and were 
also told that the distractor items were “tulvers” and to touch these as well.  
Results and Discussion 
The average minimum height of objects called tall for the 9 target items was 6.89 
inches, while the average maximum height of objects called short was 2.94 inches (see 
Figures 3 and 4). Data were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA parallel to that in 
Experiment 1. There was a significant difference between the average minimum height of 
objects called tall and the average maximum height of objects called short, F (1, 12) = 
73.05, p < .001. There was no main effect of order or interaction between adjective and 
order. As in previous conditions, 4-year-olds had an imperfect understanding of the 
adjective short. Though all children called the tallest object tall, 7 out of 16 children did   27
not call the shortest object short, including one who said that no objects were short.  
We compared the results of this experiment with those from the short distractor 
condition of Experiment 2, in which short distractors received the same name as targets. 
Judgments made in the context of short same-kind distractors (Exp. 2) were significantly 
lower than those made in the context of short different-kind distractors (Exp. 3) for tall 
trials (5.44 vs. 6.89 inches), F (1, 24) = 8.87, p < .01, and for short trials (2.19 vs. 2.94 
inches), F (1, 24) = 3.0, p < .05, one-tailed. However, a comparison of Experiments 1 and 
3 revealed no differences between the baseline condition (Exp. 1) and the different-kind 
condition (Exp. 3) for either tall trials (7.19 vs. 6.89 inches), or short trials (3.19 vs. 2.94 
inches). This suggests that children successfully attended to kind information in order to 
establish the standard of comparison for the target comparison class. Added objects only 
affected tall and short judgments for the target set when they were of the same kind. 
EXPERIMENT 4 
Experiment 3 suggests that 4-year-old children are sensitive to kind information when 
assessing the statistical properties of comparison classes. However, the experiment leaves 
open the question of whether children’s creation of distinct comparison classes for the 
two types of objects (pimwits and tulvers) was based on the objects having distinct 
physical properties or distinct labels. Only the second possibility would provide evidence 
for a compositional analysis in which meaning of the adjective depended on the meaning 
of the noun per se.  Thus, it is unclear whether children’s comparison classes are based on 
linguistic criteria (i.e., kind categories delineated by language) or on non-linguistic 
conceptual or perceptual categories. To address this question, we tested children using the 
objects of Experiment 3 (i.e., pimwits and distractor tulver objects) but called all of the   28
objects pimwits. If children include objects in comparison classes on the basis of their 
names, then they should shift their judgments relative to the baseline and show judgments 
similar to those found in Experiment 2, in which distractors were physically identical to 
target items. However, if their comparison classes are based on perceptual or basic-level 
conceptual categories, then they should fail to shift their judgments relative to baseline 
and show judgments similar to Experiment 3. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 16 English-speaking children not tested in Experiments 1-3 (M: 4;6, 
range 4;0 – 4;11; 8 boys, 8 girls). Children were tested either in a childcare center or in 
the laboratory. 
Procedures and Stimuli 
The target and distractor objects were identical to those used in Experiment 3, and as 
before the distractors were mixed pseudo-randomly amongst the nine targets to produce 
two different array orders (identical to the orders used in the short distractor condition of 
Experiment 2). However, in familiarization, children were given additional training to be 
certain that they understood all objects were pimwits. They were asked not only to touch 
the pimwits but were also told that some pimwits are pink and some are grey, that some 
have eyes and that some don’t have eyes. Children were asked to find a pimwit with eyes 
and one without eyes, or to find a grey pimwit and a pink pimwit. In this way, we were 
sure that children understood that all objects were pimwits.  
Results and Discussion 
The average minimum height of objects called tall for the 9 target items was 5.69   29
inches, while the average maximum height of objects called short was 3.69 inches (see 
Figures 7 and 8). Data were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA parallel to that in 
Experiment 1. There was a significant difference between the average minimum height of 
objects called tall and the average maximum height of objects called short, F (1, 12) = 
14.63, p < .001. There was no effect of order or interaction between adjective and order. 
A comparison of Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that when the perceptually different 
distractor items were given the same name as target items, the average height of objects 
called tall was significantly lower than it was when distractors were given a different 
name (5.69 vs. 6.89 inches), F (1, 24) = 8.14, p < .005. Further, tall judgments for target 
items did not differ from those in Experiment 2, where distractor objects were both 
physically similar to target items and were given the same name, F (1, 24) = .22, p > .6.  
However, as in the tall distractor condition of Experiment 2, short judgments did not 
shift in the expected way. First, there was no difference between short judgments here 
relative to those in Experiment 3 (M=3.69 and M= 2.94 inches, for Experiments 3 and 4 
respectively), F (1, 24) = 2.27, p > .1. Second, there was a significant difference between 
short judgments in this experiment and Experiment 2. The maximum height called short 
was significantly higher when distractors with the same name were perceptually different 
from targets than when they were perceptually similar, F (1, 24) = 9.00, p < .01.  
We see two plausible accounts of why children’s judgments for short do not shift as 
they do for tall. First, it is possible that many children have not yet acquired the meaning 
of short. In Experiment 4, 5 out of 16 children did not call the shortest target item short. 
Among these children, the average maximum of objects called short was 4.2 inches, 
compared to 3.45 inches for the remaining children. In addition, 6 out of 16 did not call   30
the even shorter distractor items short. Further, as noted earlier, some children insisted 
that the shortest objects were not short because they were small, suggesting that the two 
may initially have mutually exclusive meanings. Another possible explanation is that 
children of this age do understand short, but fail to assign the shortest pimwits to the tall-
short scale because the objects lack a sufficiently large height:width ratio. By this 
account, children prefer to call the shortest objects small these objects fit onto the big-
small scale, but not the tall-short scale. In either case, data from tall judgments may 
provide a more reliable indicator of the effect of linguistic information on the creation of 
comparison classes, since the children show greater mastery of this term. 
In summary, in Experiment 4, when distractor items were physically different from 
targets but were given the same name, children’s tall judgments shifted to the same 
extent as in the short distractor condition of Experiment 2. For tall at least, the kind term 
was sufficient for including both targets and distractors in a single comparison class.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
By at least 4-years of age, children learning English are able to derive composed 
meanings from novel adjective-noun combinations, and can rapidly integrate subtle 
changes in the statistical properties of object arrays to shift their standard for applying 
adjectives. At least for tall, this sensitivity to statistical information is guided mainly by 
linguistic cues to categorization: objects that have different shapes but the same name are 
included in determining the application of an adjective-noun pair, suggesting that, for 4-
year-olds, linguistic information is sufficient for creating comparison classes. 
The data from this study suggest that for gradable adjectives like tall, children access 
a relative interpretation that is specific to particular kinds of things labeled as such and   31
are sensitive to shifts in the statistical properties of arrays in applying adjectives to sets. 
Young children can shift their application of adjectives based on the distribution of sizes 
in an object array, even in absence of previous ostensive learning.   
Integrating semantics and world knowledge 
Knowing the meaning of the adjective tall does not alone indicate how the word 
should be applied to objects in the world. On its own, the adjective meaning supports 
inference, but not the application of the term. For example, knowing that a pimwit is tall 
tells us that pimwits are the types of things that have vertical extension. We can also infer 
that if an individual pimwit is tall, then it is likely taller than most other objects of its 
kind, independent of its absolute height. Further, we can infer that a tall pimwit is not 
short for a pimwit. However, without knowledge about the range of heights that are 
typical for pimwits, we cannot judge whether a given pimwit is tall or short, since things 
can only be labeled as such relative to other individuals. For familiar kinds of things, 
semantic, inferential, knowledge is supplemented by world knowledge regarding the 
typical sizes of kind members. This type of world knowledge allows us to apply tall to 
people, trees and buildings. Thus, to apply adjectives like tall, children need to acquire 
not only the compositional semantics of gradable adjectives, but also how this semantics 
relates to the typical sizes of kinds of things in the world. 
How is world knowledge combined with the compositional semantics of adjectives? 
As noted earlier, many accounts propose that gradable adjectives represent functions that 
result in the ordering of objects according to a scale (e.g., of height, width, etc.). This 
scale may be composed of degrees (e.g., degrees of height; Cresswell, 1976; Kennedy, 
1999), or may order objects without appeal to a degree semantics (Klein, 1991). For each   32
scale, adjectives like tall and short specify positions in the ordering. Thus, no appeal to 
knowledge of things in the world is required to grasp the semantics of the adjective, since 
relations between adjectives and degrees can be stated independent of actual measures. 
To use this knowledge for identifying tall and short things, the child must amass a 
database of typical object sizes (e.g., the heights of trees, boys, etc.), and divide up each 
class into tall and short sub-classes. This requires setting a value, or standard, against 
which set members can be compared and classified as tall or short. For example, children 
may assume that for all gradable adjectives, the standard of comparison is defined by the 
arithmetic mean, such that tall tree applies to all trees that are taller than average. 
Alternatively, they may assume that tall refers to all degrees above the third quartile of 
values (i.e., that it means taller than most objects). Whichever standard is used, the child 
must apply it to data for particular kinds of things in order to determine its value. For 
example, assuming that the standard is defined as an arithmetic mean, the child would 
need to collect information about the average heights of trees to set the value of the 
standard for the kind TREE. Having determined this value, the child would then be ready 
to apply the adjective tall to trees in the world. 
The question of how semantic structures and world knowledge are related leaves open 
the processes by which they become related in development. Do they emerge 
independently, or does one depend on the other in acquisition? One possibility, which we 
will label the Innate Standards hypothesis, is that the semantic relation between 
adjectives and standards is not learned, and that upon realizing that a novel word is 
gradable (perhaps via syntactic cues like comparative morphology), children assume that 
it has an opposite and that these opposites exhaustively divide sets in two, or   33
alternatively, result in a three-way categorization of objects (e.g., tall, short, and neither 
tall nor short). Given this assumption, children might then make use of whatever domain 
general tools they have available for assigning absolute values (i.e., object sizes) to this 
division (e.g., using prototype structures that represent mean size). According to this 
view, their acquisition of statistical information relevant to defining standards of 
comparison could take place independent of their acquisition of semantic knowledge, and 
the two could be paired up when sufficient statistical information is available. 
Alternatively, by the Constructed Standards hypothesis, children might infer how 
adjectives name subsets of object orderings (i.e., what in fact defines the statistical 
standard) by observing how adjectives are used by others to describe particular things in 
the world (e.g., that men 5’11” and taller are called tall men, and 5’8” and shorter are 
called  short men). By learning such orderings via ostension for a subset of nouns, 
children might then abstract the notion of a standard and apply notion to novel objects in 
absence of ostensive evidence. Thus, a bottom-up ordering of objects might be used to 
infer the existence of a standard and what defines it. 
The data presented here address only certain aspects of this learnability question. The 
data demonstrate that children do not need to learn all standards of comparison by 
ostension (e.g., by hearing certain things called tall and other things called short). 
Instead, they can compute a standard based on the properties of things being referred to. 
Thus, by at least 4-years-old, and possibly earlier, children have an internalized set of 
criteria for establishing standards of comparison for known adjectives that can be applied 
in a general fashion to new kinds of things. To explore the question of how this ability 
develops, two additional paths of investigation suggest themselves. First, on the   34
Constructed Standards account (where the notion of a standard and its definition are 
abstracted from parental language use), the way in which standards are specified for 
adjectives should be subject to substantial variation, whether between children or cross-
linguistically. Since the standard is determined by the input on this account, children’s 
conception of the possible divisions of sets by adjectives should be malleable. So, if told 
from the beginning that the tallest ¾ of trees are tall trees (for example), children should 
happily abstract a standard that treats the tallest ¾ of pimwits as tall pimwits. However, 
by the Innate Standards view, where semantic representations emerge independent of 
statistical knowledge of particular kinds, little or no variation is expected between 
children or across cultures, and children’s assumptions about adjective meanings should 
be relatively impervious to training. Even if explicitly told that the tallest ¾ of various 
sets are tall, very young children should still retain a semantics that divides sets as 
children do in the current study (e.g., where roughly the top 1/3 are called tall). 
 Second, if children used world knowledge regarding the typical sizes of things to 
bootstrap their semantic representations for gradable adjectives, we would expect them to 
acquire knowledge about the typical sizes of things sometime before they understand the 
compositional semantics of adjective-noun combinations. Based on this, it is imperative 
to compare the behavior of 4-year-olds with younger children who are just beginning to 
acquire gradable adjectives. As noted in the introduction, previous studies have 
documented that even 2-year-olds have some knowledge of the typical sizes of household 
objects, suggesting that this type of world knowledge is acquired early in development 
(Ebeling & Gelman, 1988; Gelman & Ebeling, 1989; Sera, Troyer & Smith, 1988; see 
also Carey & Potter, reported in Carey, 1978). Also, Smith et al. (1986) present evidence   35
that for 5-year-olds but not 4-year-olds, the reference points for high and low are affected 
by changes in the range of heights presented to children, suggesting that the younger 
children were not computing a context sensitive standard under these conditions. 
However, as noted earlier, it is unclear whether adjectives like high interact with kind 
information in the same way as tall to derive composed meanings (i.e., it is unclear that 
children should acquire a standard for interpreting high bunny in the same way they 
might for tall man, since being tall is a property that gets its meaning from the relation 
between objects, whereas being high is not typically a property between objects of a kind, 
but between objects and the ground). 
Future studies should examine whether there is a stage at which very young children 
have knowledge of the typical sizes of things in absence of a capacity to deploy a 
standard of comparison for novel sets. Here we have shown that 4-year-olds have 
combined these two forms of knowledge, and we have provided a paradigm which can be 
extended to younger children, in order to explore the way in which these representations 
are acquired. 
. 
Falling short of short 
Children’s mastery of short may not be complete by 4. In each of the experiments 
reported here, children exhibited an asymmetry between their judgments for tall and 
short. In all, 21 of the 80 children tested (26.3%), failed to call the shortest object short, 
despite always calling the tallest object tall, and despite correctly interpreting the 
comparative forms of both tall and short (i.e., taller, shorter). This finding is consistent 
with a large body of literature that has examined children’s acquisition of positive and   36
negative polar terms, including big vs. little, tall vs. short, and more vs. less. In general, 
when children exhibit differences in their ability to understand one of a pair of adjectives, 
it is the negative polar item that exhibits a delay (e.g., Donaldson & Wales, 1970; Ehri, 
1976; Townsend, 1976; see Johnston, 1985, for a review).  
However, the exact source of the asymmetry found in this study remains unclear. 
Children who failed to call the shortest objects short may have done so because they 
lacked an adult interpretation of the word, or may have understood the word but thought 
that it did not apply to objects that were extremely short. As noted earlier, children 
insisted on several occasions that the shortest objects in a set were not short but instead 
were small or little. This could be attributed to a mutually exclusive interpretation of 
short and small (where small applies to the shortest objects, and short to middling 
values), or alternatively, could be due to a geometric constraint. For example, some 
children may have refused to call very short objects short because the ratio between their 
vertical and horizontal extents was not sufficiently large. As noted by Lang (1989) 
geometric constraints of this kind restrict the application of adjectives, precluding the use 
of tall to name objects that typically have equal horizontal and vertical extents (e.g., like 
a pebble; see also Fillmore, 1977). Such a constraint would explain not only children’s 
reluctance to call very short things short but also why they occasionally fail to consider 
very short things when calculating the standard of comparison, as in Experiments 2 and 
4: things that lack tallness altogether may not count as inputs to determining the average 
height of a set, since they are not mapped to the relevant scale. To contrast this 
hypothesis with the possibility that short is mutually exclusive with small future studies 
should test children using objects where the shortest objects have a greater height-width   37
ratio (e.g., using either taller or skinnier objects). 
Summary: Knowing what it means to be a tall pimwit 
At the core of the problem of language acquisition is the question of when, and how, 
children begin analyzing and generating expressions using a generative syntactic system. 
Creative language use depends on understanding compositionality - how the meanings of 
complex expressions are a function of their syntax and the meanings of their constituent 
parts. This study suggests that by at least 4-years of age, children draw on knowledge of 
compositionality to interpret novel adjective + noun combinations. Without being told 
which pimwits are tall or short, children can apply these adjectives in a systematic 
fashion based on small amounts of experience. Further, the study indicates that this 
compositional knowledge is linked to sensitive statistical representations. Even small 
shifts in the average height of objects (e.g., 2 inches) are detectable by children, and 
license shifts in how they apply adjectives to novel sets. Thus, by 4-years of age, children 
appear to use a compositional semantics for interpreting subsective adjective expressions 
like  tall pimwit, suggesting that by at least this age, adjective + noun combinations 
engage a rich understanding of syntax and semantics for their interpretation. 
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